

Vietnam: Not Civil War, But Aggression From Hanoi

April 65

months the Communists have con-
 dly stepped up their fighting in
 They have intensified their drive
 r South Vietnam and incorporate
 mmunist North Vietnam.

r in Vietnam is much more than a
 ict in a small, far-away country.
 in Vietnam is an extremely im-
 ase of the worldwide cold and hot
 g waged by Moscow, Peiping and
 Communist forces for the conquest
 rld and remodeling it after the pat-
 talitarian dictatorship.

nists of every stripe and sect real-
 s at stake for them in the war they
 g against the people of South Viet-
 t is why they have mobilized their
 and fellow-travellers in a terrific
 to mislead the people of the world
 origin and issues of the conflict.
 nstances honest and sincere people,
 or peace, have become prey to the
 Communist propaganda.

r to counter the Communist mis-
 tion and prevent Communists from
 the widespread sincere desire for
 U.S. State Department has recent-
 ed a whitebook entitled "Aggression
 North. The Record of North Viet-
 n Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam."
 mentation deals with one of the
 unist lies about the war in Viet-
 e which concerns the nature of the
 The Communists maintain that the
 spontaneous and local rebellion
 the established government. The
 artment's publication sets the rec-
 rd and shows that:

nam a Communist government has
 eliberately to conquer a sovereign
 a neighboring state. And to achieve
 has used every resource of its own
 nt to carry out its carefully planned
 of concealed aggression. North Viet-
 nmitment to seize control of the
 no less total than was the commit-
 he regime in North Korea in 1950.
 ing the consequences of the latter's
 ed attack, the planners in Hanoi
 l desperately to conceal their hand.
 e failed and their aggression is as
 at of an invading army."

vidence shows that the hard core of
 unist forces attacking South Viet-
 n trained in North Vietnam. They
 ed into the South and remain under
 ry High Command in Hanoi. Since
 n the pace of aggression was ac-
 nearly 20,000 Vietcong officers,
 nd technicians are known to have
 uth Vietnam. An estimated 17,000
 ilitators were dispatched to the
 ing the past 6 years. It is now esti-
 at the Vietcong number approxi-
 ,000 so-called hard-core forces, and
 0,000-80,000 local forces.

itebook stated: "It is thus apparent
 rators from the North—allowing for
 —make up the majority of the
 hard-core Vietcong. Personnel from
 in short, are now and have always
 backbone of the entire Vietcong

er, the evidence shows that many

of the weapons and much of the ammuni-
 tion and other supplies used by the Vietcong
 have been sent into South Vietnam from
 Hanoi, Communist China and other Com-
 munist states (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia
 and East Germany).

The directing force behind the effort to
 conquer South Vietnam is the Communist
 Party in the North, the Lao Dong (Workers)
 Party which forms the basis of the North
 Vietnam regime. At its third congress in
 Hanoi in September 1960 the Party pro-
 claimed as one of its two tasks "to liberate
 the South," the other being "to carry out
 the socialist revolution in North Vietnam."

Three months later Hanoi announced the
 creation of the "Front for Liberation of the
 South." This organization is the screen be-
 hind which the Communists carry out their
 program of conquest. It is pictured by Com-
 munist propaganda as an organization es-
 tablished and run by the people in the South
 themselves. Actually, it is the creature of the
 Communist government in Hanoi.

Military affairs of the Vietcong are the
 responsibility of the High Command of the
 People's Army of North Vietnam and the
 Ministry of Defense, under close supervision
 from the Lao Dong Party. The hard core of
 the Vietcong military organization is the
 full-time regular unit usually based on a
 province or region. These are well-trained
 and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters, who
 are well armed with a variety of effective
 weapons including 75 mm. recoilless rifles and
 81-82 mm. mortars.

The main force units of the Vietcong are
 supported by an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-
 time guerrillas. Many of the village-guerril-
 las are dragooned into service with the Viet-
 cong. Some are kidnapped; others are
 threatened; still others join to prevent their
 families from being harmed.

Funds from Hanoi

Money to pay the regular Vietcong units
 comes from a variety of sources. Funds are
 sent from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from
 the local population. Landowners and planta-
 tion operators often must pay a tribute to
 the Vietcong as the price for not having
 their lands devastated. Similarly, transporta-
 tion companies have been forced to pay the
 Vietcong or face the threat of having their
 buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and
 wealthy people have been kidnapped for ran-
 som. The Vietcong have often stopped buses
 and taken the money and valuables of all on
 board.

For the most part the Vietcong have con-
 centrated their attention on individuals, iso-
 lated or poorly defended outposts, and small
 centers of population. Schools and hospitals
 have been among their favorite targets. In
 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs
 and other government officials were killed
 outright by the Vietcong and 1,131 were
 kidnapped. More than 1,350 civilians were
 killed in bombings and other acts of sabotage.

In 1961 the government of the Republic
 of South Vietnam presented evidence of
 Hanoi's aggression against South Vietnam
 to the International Commission for Super-
 vision and Control in Vietnam (ICC). The
 ICC is composed of delegates from India

(chairman), Canada and Poland. A special
 report by the ICC in 1962 upheld the validity
 of that evidence. The Commission held that
 there was "sufficient evidence to show be-
 yond reasonable doubt" that North Vietnam
 had sent arms and men into South Vietnam
 to carry out subversion with the aim of over-
 throwing the legal government there. The
 ICC found the authorities in Hanoi in spe-
 cific violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27
 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostili-
 ties in Vietnam.

In the years since it was condemned by
 the ICC, North Vietnam has intensified its
 efforts to extend its rule over South Viet-
 nam. Within recent months the Communists
 of North Vietnam have ordered the "mili-
 tarization of the whole country." As their
 own economic difficulties have mounted, they
 have stepped up their aggressive actions.
 They look upon this conflict as the "model of
 a new guerrilla war" for all Asian, African
 and Latin American countries.

On June 2, 1964, North Vietnamese Pre-
 mier Tham Van Dong declared that "this ex-
 perience of our compatriots in South Vietnam
 attracts the attention of the world, espe-
 cially the peoples in South America. Our
 Southern citizens are teaching other peoples
 that they are certainly capable of defeating
 the U.S. imperialists. . . . The struggle of
 our Southern compatriots is as great a con-
 tribution to the peoples' revolution in the
 world as the battle of Dien Bien Phu."

In the same vein, the military leader, Gen-
 eral Giap, stressed on July 19, 1964—on the
 tenth anniversary of the Geneva Agreement
 on Indochina—that: "South Vietnam is the
 model of the national liberation movement
 in our time. . . . If the special warfare that
 the U.S. imperialists are testing in South
 Vietnam is overcome, this means that it can
 be defeated everywhere in the world."

From this it is clear that for the Com-
 munist of the world the war in Vietnam is
 a staging ground, just as the war against
 the Spanish people was the staging ground
 for the Nazis in their drive for world con-
 quest—a drive which led to the Second World
 War.

No one should minimize the severe diffi-
 culties facing South Vietnam and the United
 States in their great endeavors to stop the
 Communist aggressors. At the same time no
 one should forget that, though backed fully
 by Moscow and Peiping, North Vietnam is on
 the brink of starvation. In contrast, South
 Vietnam, though war-tormented, is able to
 feed its own population and to export almost
 as much rice and rubber as it did in peace-
 time.

The United States can view with pride its
 role in Asia. Ours is the only big country in
 the world which has never had and does not
 have today any territorial designs or aggres-
 sive ambitions in the world's most populous
 continent. Had we not spilled our blood and
 spent our resources so lavishly to win the war
 in the Pacific a generation ago, not a single
 country on this continent would be enjoying
 national independence today.

In helping the people of South Vietnam
 to resist Hanoi's armed aggression, the
 United States seeks no territory, no military

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